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REFLECTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AFTER MORE THAN 
FIFTY YEARS 
NORMAN LEFSTEIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
The title of this article is likely understood as a reference to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,1 decided more than fifty 
years ago, in 1963. While “Fifty Years” does refer in part to Gideon, my title 
has a double meaning. Six months after Gideon was decided, I accepted my 
first criminal court appointments to represent defendants unable to afford 
counsel.2 Since 1963, I have worked in various capacities studying criminal 
and juvenile public defense systems. These efforts have included drafting 
American Bar Association standards for providing defense services and 
preparing national reports and other publications dealing with the defense of 
accused persons unable to hire a lawyer.3 
One of my favorite John Lennon songs is “Imagine,” which includes the 
well-known lyric, “you may say I’m a dreamer.” Well, I have dreamed a lot 
about what state court public defense systems in the United States would look 
like if we could start over based on what we know now about providing 
 
* Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law; 
LL.B., 1961, University of Illinois; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center. 
 1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 2. At the time, I was two years out of law school and a member of the E. Barrett Prettyman 
Program in Trial Advocacy at the Georgetown University Law Center. A major component of the 
program was providing defense services in the District of Columbia for persons in criminal and 
juvenile cases financially unable to afford a lawyer. 
 3. See, e.g., NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW 
IN PUBLIC DEFENSE (2011) [hereinafter LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS]; 
NATIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMMITTEE, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING 
NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009) [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED] (I 
served as co-reporter and principal author); ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND 
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE 
WORKLOADS (2009) (I served as reporter); ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND 
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR 
EQUAL JUSTICE (2005) [hereinafter ABA GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE] (I served as co-author); 
The Defense Function, in THE ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1980) (I served 
as reporter); Providing Defense Services, in THE ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d 
ed. 1980) (I served as reporter). 
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adequate defense services for the millions of persons who cannot afford their 
own lawyer. If this were possible, I am confident public defense would not 
look like it does today in most of the country. So, in this brief essay, I discuss 
my dreams as I imagine public defense programs as I wish they were, not as 
most actually are. 
I.  ORGANIZATION OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS 
First and foremost, public defense services would be organized on a 
statewide basis and the program overseen by an independent, non-partisan 
commission that would adopt appropriate enforceable standards. At a 
minimum, the commission’s standards would deal with attorney performance, 
qualifications to provide representation, supervision of public defenders and 
private lawyers, and would address the workloads and supervision of all 
lawyers providing defense services.4 In addition, the funding for public 
defenders and private lawyers would be adequate,5 and sufficient support staffs 
of “experts, investigators, social workers, paralegals, secretaries, technology, 
research capabilities, and training” provided.6 Funding for the defense program 
would be substantially from the state’s general revenues7 rather than derived 
from fees paid by poor persons8 or from unstable sources of funding.9 
One of the commission’s primary goals would be to assure that the same 
quality of defense representation is provided throughout the state so that there 
are not major differences among local jurisdictions. Absent a statewide defense 
program, we know from experience that there will be significant differences in 
the quality of representation provided throughout the state’s governmental 
subdivisions.10 
 
 4. These recommendations are consistent with those endorsed by the National Right to 
Counsel Committee organized by the Constitution Project. See Recommendations 2, 3, 5, and 6 in 
JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 185–94. 
 5. Id. at 194. 
 6. Id. at 196. 
 7. Id. at 189. 
 8. See, e.g., ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 1 (2010) (“Thirteen of the 
fifteen states [with the highest prison populations in the United States] . . . charge poor people 
public defender fees simply for exercising their constitutional right to counsel.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Campbell Robertson, In Louisiana, the Poor Lack Legal Defense, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/us/in-louisiana-the-poor-lack-legal-de 
fense.html [http://perma.cc/52MG-LNKF] (“While the [statewide public defender] board 
distributes a central fund to the various districts, that state money is simply meant to supplement 
what for nearly all the districts is the main source of revenue: traffic tickets and local court 
fees.”). 
 10. In Indiana, for example, counties receive partial reimbursements of forty percent for 
indigent defense felony expenses if the county elects to participate in the state’s reimbursement 
program, which requires compliance with various standards and is administered by the Indiana 
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More than fifty years since the Gideon decision, still less than half the 
states have independent commissions with complete oversight of the state’s 
public defense services. According to a chart prepared by the Sixth 
Amendment Center, the exact count appears to be nineteen states, most of 
which provide, as in Missouri, 100% of the funding from the state’s general 
revenues.11 However, in Missouri, as in many of the nineteen states, the 
funding is insufficient to mount a strong public defense program that ensures 
quality representation for accused persons throughout the state.12 
II.  FEDERAL FUNDING FOR STATE PUBLIC DEFENSE 
Now I have a second dream: federal funding to assist states in providing 
defense services for those who cannot afford a lawyer. By virtue of United 
States Supreme Court decisions,13 implementation of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel is a vital, albeit politically unpopular, unfunded mandate 
imposed on the fifty states and the District of Columbia. The Supreme Court’s 
decisions are now decades old, yet no significant federal funding to assure their 
implementation has ever been provided. In 1979, the American Bar 
Association (ABA) passed a resolution urging that the federal government 
establish a Center for Defense Services to assist the states in providing 
counsel.14 The ABA thought this made sense since the states were charged 
 
Public Defender Commission (IPDC). A recent study of Indiana noted significant differences 
among Indiana counties in providing defense services and found that “[t]he State of Indiana has 
no mechanism to ensure that its constitutional obligation to provide effective counsel to the 
indigent accused is met in felony and juvenile delinquency cases, at both the trial level and on 
direct appeal, in counties and courts that do not participate in the IPDC reimbursement program.” 
SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER, Executive Summary of THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN INDIANA: 
EVALUATION OF TRIAL LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES (2016). 
 11. For the Sixth Amendment Center’s chart of the fifty states plus the District of Columbia, 
see Know Your State, SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER (2013), http://sixthamendment.org/know-your 
-state/ [http://perma.cc/SWN4-Z5NZ]. 
 12. See, e.g., Camila Domonoske, Overworked and Underfunded, Mo. Public Defender 
Office Assigns Case — To The Governor, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 4, 2016, 12:34 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/08/04/488655916/overworked-and-underfunded-
missouri-public-defender-assigns-a-case-to-the-govern [http://perma.cc/T5PM-G8CL]. 
 13. In addition to Gideon, other key Supreme Court decisions extending the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of legal representation for those unable to afford a lawyer include: In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (right to counsel applies in cases in which juveniles are charged with 
delinquency); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972) (right to counsel extends to 
misdemeanor cases resulting in a defendant’s loss of liberty); and Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 
654, 662 (2002) (defendants may not be imprisoned for probation violations if not extended the 
right to counsel when found guilty of the underlying offense for which sentence was suspended). 
 14. See A.B.A., STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1979), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ad 
ministrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/downloads/20110325_aba_121.authcheckdam.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/PC24-HSS7] (resolution for “establishment of an independent federally funded 
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with implementing a federal constitutional guarantee without any meaningful 
federal assistance. In fact, the ABA concluded that its proposal was so sensible 
that for a second time, in 2013, the organization again approved a resolution 
urging federal funding for defense services in state courts.15 
Ironically, although there is not a broad based civil right to counsel 
guarantee, many years ago the federal government established the Legal 
Services Corporation (LSC), which in FY 2016 had a budget of $385 million.16 
While I applaud the establishment of the LSC, I simply observe that nothing of 
this sort has ever been enacted by the federal government to assist states in 
implementing the Sixth Amendment’s constitutional right to counsel in 
criminal and juvenile cases. 
III.  SUBSTANTIAL PRIVATE BAR INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 
Another of my dreams is substantial private bar representation in public 
defense in all states. This is not because I oppose having full-time public 
defenders. To the contrary, I am a former public defender and believe strongly 
in having well-funded, full-time, trained public defenders throughout the 
country. Moreover, I believe that the vast majority of public defenders are 
knowledgeable, dedicated, and make important contributions in defending their 
clients despite usually having far too many cases and inadequate support 
 
Center for Defense Services for the purpose of assisting and strengthening state and local 
governments in carrying out their constitutional obligations to provide effective assistance of 
counsel for the defense of poor persons in state and local criminal proceedings.”). For further 
discussion of this proposal, see Norman Lefstein & Sheldon Portman, Implementing the Right to 
Counsel in State Criminal Cases, 66 A.B.A. 1084, 1084 (1980). A similar proposal was 
recommended by the National Right to Counsel Committee. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, 
at 200: “Recommendation 12—The federal government should establish an independent, 
adequately funded National Center for Defense Services to assist and strengthen the ability of 
state governments to provide quality legal representation for persons unable to afford counsel in 
criminal cases and juvenile delinquency proceedings.” 
 15. See A.B.A., RESOLUTION 104A (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ad 
ministrative/house_of_delegates/resolutions/2013_hod_midyear_meeting_104a.docx [http://per 
ma.cc/6ZFF-T3LX] (resolution of the American Bar Association urging that “Congress . . . 
establish an independent federally funded Center for Indigent Defense Services for the purpose of 
assisting state, local, tribal and territorial governments in carrying out their Constitutional 
obligation to provide effective assistance of counsel for the defense of the indigent accused in 
criminal, juvenile, and civil commitment proceedings, and to appropriate sufficient funds for the 
Center to successfully carry out its mission.”). 
 16. See FY 17 Budget Request, LEGAL SERVICES CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/media-center/ 
publications/fy-2017-budget-request#bfrtoc-fy-2017-budget-request [http://perma.cc/Z8RL-ZM 
ZR] (“Congress appropriated $385 million to LSC for FY 2016, $10 million more than the 
previous year. Compared to its largest appropriation of $420 million in FY 2010, however, LSC’s 
funding has decreased by 8%, or $35 million.”). 
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services.17 But I also believe that ample private bar defense representation is 
essential. Unless private lawyers are involved in public defense, the likelihood 
is overwhelming that caseloads of public defenders will expand beyond their 
capacity, and there will be no alternative except to fall back on overworked 
public defenders to handle the caseload.18 This has often been the history of 
public defense in state courts, as caseloads have outstripped the capacity of 
public defender programs and the private bar’s involvement has been 
marginalized. 
The ABA has long recommended that there be “substantial participation” 
by private lawyers in providing public defense representation.19 That goal has 
been fulfilled in the federal courts, in which, pursuant to the Criminal Justice 
Act, private lawyers are substantially involved in defense representation and 
thus serve as a vital safety valve in assuring that federal public defenders are 
not overloaded with too many cases.20 The same situation should prevail in 
state criminal courts as well. 
But it is not sufficient to have substantial numbers of private lawyers 
involved in public defense. The lawyers need to be adequately compensated, 
trained, supervised, and their level of experience matched with the seriousness 
of the charges against the accused. Unless the public defender agency oversees 
the private bar’s involvement in public defense, as in Massachusetts,21 the sort 
of program that makes the most sense is to provide for an assigned counsel 
program in which there is full time staff not only to operate the program, but 
also to train, mentor, and supervise, as necessary, the private defense lawyers. 
 
 17. Lack of funding, high caseloads, and other problems are effectively summarized in the 
most recent and extensive national report on public defense. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, 
at 2. Excessive caseloads also are discussed in id. at 65–70. 
 18. The importance of private bar involvement in indigent defense representation was 
illustrated several years ago in a Missouri case, in which the trial court acknowledged that the 
public defender was overworked, but since there were no private lawyers to appoint the judge told 
the public defender that he would have to handle the defendant’s case despite his caseload. See 
LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS, supra note 3, at 236–37. 
 19. The first edition of standards relating to defense services approved by the ABA 
recommended the following: 
Assignments [of cases] should be distributed as widely as possible among the qualified 
members of the bar. Every lawyer licensed to practice law in the jurisdiction, experienced 
and active in trial practice, and familiar with the practice and procedure of the criminal 
courts should be included in the roster of attorneys from which assignments are made. 
Std. 2.2 in A.B.A., STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 26 (1968) 
[hereinafter ABA PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES (1968)]. Current ABA-approved standards 
contain the following recommendation: “The plan for legal representation should include 
substantial participation by assigned counsel.” Std. 5-2.1 in A.B.A., ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 29 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter ABA 
PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES]. 
 20. See LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS, supra note 3, at 238–39 nn.43–45. 
 21. Id. at 202–05. 
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The leadership of the program must also be staunch advocates for reasonable 
compensation for private defense lawyers, as well as assuring that investigators 
and experts are made available. Several years ago the Texas legislature 
authorized counties to establish “managed assigned counsel” programs, which 
are capable of implementing programs with these attributes.22 
The model for the Texas statute has been the successful Private Defender 
Program developed by the San Mateo County Bar Association in San Mateo, 
California, which is an assigned counsel program featuring training, 
mentoring, supervision, and staff to operate the program and monitor lawyer 
performance. In fact, there is even a chief investigator who assists lawyers in 
identifying and training private investigators.23 This program is quite different 
from the vast majority of assigned counsel programs in state courts, in which 
there is no meaningful oversight of the private lawyers and no real assessment 
of whether defense performance standards are achieved. 
It is also necessary to certify the lawyers who provide representation to 
ensure that they are genuinely qualified for the seriousness of the cases to 
which they are assigned. No public defender program worth its name asks its 
lawyers to defend cases for which they lack the requisite training and 
experience. Similarly, assigned counsel and contract defense programs ought 
never to permit private lawyers to defend persons when they lack the necessary 
qualifications. The solution to making sure that all defense counsel, whether 
public defenders or private lawyers, are adequately prepared to represent 
accused persons in various types of cases is to assess carefully their 
 
 22.  
When a person charged with a crime cannot afford to hire a lawyer, judges in most Texas 
counties appoint a private attorney from a list maintained by the courts. While this type of 
system, known as an assigned counsel system, can provide an effective means for some 
jurisdictions to meet Constitutional requirements, it can present several challenges for 
judges to effectively provide the oversight and quality control required given their 
primary duties and given that their visibility of attorney performance is limited to 
courtroom interaction. 
In order to enhance the independence and quality of indigent defense in Texas, the 
legislature has authorized a new option, called a Managed Assigned Counsel system. In 
2011, the 82nd Texas State Legislature enacted HB 1754, establishing procedures for 
counties to create managed assigned counsel (MAC) programs, which were defined as ‘a 
program operated with public funds by a governmental entity, nonprofit corporation, or 
bar association under a written agreement with a governmental entity other than an 
individual judge or court; and for the purpose of appointing counsel under Article 26.04 
of the Texas Code of Criminal procedure or Section 51.10 of the Family Code.’ 
Managed Assigned Counsel Program Overview/Implementation Steps, CENTER FOR COURT 
INNOVATION, http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/ManagedAssigned 
CounselProgram.pdf [http://perma.cc/PB7B-X96B]. 
 23. The Private Defender Program has been providing defense services in San Mateo 
County, California, for many years. For a discussion of the program, see LEFSTEIN, SECURING 
REASONABLE CASELOADS, supra note 3, at 217–28. 
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qualifications.24 The principle that lawyers who represent death penalty cases 
should be certified to defend capital cases is well accepted.25 This approach 
should be extended to private lawyers and public defenders when representing 
persons in all types of cases, especially serious felonies.26 
IV.  PUBLIC DEFENDER REFERRALS TO QUALIFIED PRIVATE LAWYERS 
Undoubtedly, one of the most vexing problems in public defense is the 
incredibly large numbers of persons that public defenders represent.27 
Although ethical rules require that lawyers resist work that they can neither 
competently nor diligently handle,28 defenders nevertheless frequently do so as 
requested by their defense programs, which then becomes the prevailing 
culture of the organization.29 This pattern has been repeated throughout much 
 
 24. For example, the Massachusetts Committee on Public Counsel Services oversees the 
private lawyers who provide defense services and screens the lawyers to determine their 
qualifications for representing defendants based upon the seriousness of the cases. See LEFSTEIN, 
SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS, supra note 3, at 196. 
 25. See Guidelines 3.1(E)(1), 3.1(E)(3), and 3.1(E)(6) in A.B.A., GUIDELINES FOR THE 
APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 4 (2003), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_representation/
2003guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/32UG-XQKV]. 
 26. Of course, it is important that the certification of lawyers to handle serious felony cases 
be a searching and careful inquiry. In the well-known Netflix documentary, Making a Murderer, 
attorney Len Kachinsky represented juvenile Brendan Dassey. The documentary showed how 
Kachinsky used his investigator to obtain a videotaped confession from Dassey, which was then 
made available to the police. At the time, Kachinsky had been certified to handle serious felony 
cases by the Wisconsin State Public Defender, which coordinates the state’s private lawyer 
assigned counsel program. But after Kachinsky’s handling of the case was exposed, his 
certification for representing cases of such seriousness was withdrawn. See Bruce Vielmetti, 
Attorney in ‘Making a Murderer’ Crosshairs Admits Errors But Defends Work, MILWAUKEE 
JOURNAL SENTINEL (Jan. 6, 2016), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/attorney-in-
making-a-murderer-crosshairs-admits-errors-but-defends-work-b99646945z1-364401181.html 
[http://perma.cc/W9TD-3XMS] (“The State Public Defender decertified Kachinsky from taking 
homicide cases after it learned of the O’Kelly interview and filed a complaint with the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation. He said he agreed to take additional training and meet other conditions for a 
year as part of an alternative to discipline.”). 
 27. The problem of high caseloads was discussed earlier in conjunction with the need for 
private lawyers to be involved in public defense representation. See supra text accompanying 
note 17. 
 28. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 and r. 1.3 (A.B.A. 2014). Also, r. 1.16 (a) 
requires a lawyer to decline representation, or to seek to withdraw from continued representation, 
if continued involvement on the client’s behalf will result in the violation of a disciplinary rule. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16 (A.B.A. 2014). 
 29. Culture in public defense has been discussed in various sources. See, e.g., Understanding 
Lawyer Behavior: Why Leadership Matters, in LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS, 
supra note 3, at 95–111; Jonathan A. Rapping, Directing the Winds of Change: Using 
Organizational Culture to Reform Indigent Defense, 9 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 177, 177–220 (2008). 
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of the country in state criminal and juvenile courts, since those in charge of 
defender programs often lack the independence to challenge defense systems 
in which their lawyers practice. But this means that the public defenders are 
violating their ethical duties and Sixth Amendment obligations to render 
effective assistance of counsel.30 To justify their inaction, defense programs 
and public defenders often rationalize that the private lawyers who would take 
the cases in lieu of public defenders would do a very poor job for their clients 
and cannot be trusted to provide even minimally adequate defense 
representation.31 And, finally, if the public defender program or its lawyers 
seek relief from the trial courts, protracted litigation may well ensue in which 
judges are sometimes quite unreceptive to the defense program’s position.32 
But there is a way in which the pattern of defense programs accepting far 
too much work can be broken, which brings me to another of my dreams about 
public defense. To avoid caseload litigation and to pave the way for defender 
programs to control the caseloads of their lawyers, I suggest that all such 
programs be authorized to refer cases directly to alternative defense service 
providers rather than asking judges that the defense program and its lawyers 
not be appointed to new cases until their caseloads are brought under control. 
The successful implementation of this recommendation is dependent on 
several factors. First, either state laws, rules of court, or tacit approval of the 
judiciary must authorize defense programs to make direct referrals to private 
lawyers. And, of course, there must also be alternative defense providers who 
not only are available, but also well trained, supervised, adequately resourced, 
and fully capable of accepting direct case referrals from defense programs. 
This is why I earlier stressed the importance of there being effective defense 
 
 30. For examples of the kinds of problems that defense programs encounter when 
independence is absent, see JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 80–84. 
 31. I have been told this on many occasions when I have discussed the subject with 
overworked public defenders around the country. While I fully appreciate their point of view and 
recognize that they may be correct in their assessments, their excessive caseload problem is 
obviously not resolved when defenders accept even more clients than they can competently and 
diligently represent. Moreover, the public defenders’ viewpoint ignores the principle that they 
owe their primary allegiance to current clients and accepting more work than they can effectively 
represent further jeopardizes their ability to deliver competent and diligent representation to their 
current clients. The issue is addressed in the ABA’s ethics opinion dealing with excessive public 
defense caseloads. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441, 4–5 
(2006) (“A lawyer’s primary ethical duty is owed to existing clients. Therefore, a lawyer must 
decline to accept new cases, rather than withdraw from existing cases, if the acceptance of a new 
case will result in her workload becoming excessive.”). 
 32. For example, despite an uncontroverted trial court record, in which the public defender 
in Knoxville, Tennessee established that his lawyers had excessive misdemeanor caseloads, the 
court’s five misdemeanor trial court judges rejected the defender’s position. See discussion of the 
litigation in LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS, supra note 3, at 168–72. 
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systems in which private lawyers participate substantially in a state’s public 
defense representation program.33 
Implementation of this proposed recommendation has another important 
advantage, i.e., it removes judges from the business of appointing lawyers to 
provide defense services, a practice that has long been opposed by national 
organizations.34 In its current standards, the American Bar Association 
forcefully explains its opposition to judicial appointments of defense counsel: 
Retained lawyers are neither chosen nor approved by the courts, and there are 
no compelling reasons for defenders and private assigned counsel to be treated 
differently. Moreover, if a lawyer desires continuous appointments from the 
court or elected officials, there may be a strong temptation to compromise 
clients’ interest in ways that will maximize the number of future case 
assignments. The assignment of cases by the defender or assigned-counsel 
program also should help to alleviate the fear of clients that the defense lawyer 
is working for the judge or court official in charge of appointments.35 
In fact, there are several states in which legislatures have enacted statutes 
that enable public defender programs to do exactly what is suggested here—the 
referral of cases by defender programs directly to private defense lawyers.36 
However, the statutes have not been especially helpful to public defender 
programs with too many cases either because a strong private bar defense 
program is absent in the jurisdiction and/or there are insufficient funds to 
compensate the private lawyers.37 This, of course, does not undermine the 
 
 33. See supra text accompanying notes 17–26. 
 34. For example, during 1974–1976 the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, with 
support from the federal government, organized a national study commission on defense services 
and undertook a massive study of how best to deliver public defense services in the United States. 
The result was a 500-page report with twenty pages of black-letter recommendations. The 
commission recommended, inter alia, that appointments of defense attorneys should be 
undertaken by administrators of public defender and assigned counsel programs. See NATIONAL 
LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1, 15 (1976), http://www.nlada.net/sites/default/files/nsc_guidelinesforlegalde 
fensesystems_1976.pdf [http://perma.cc/ML34-YFL6] [hereinafter NLADA GUIDELINES FOR 
LEGAL DEFENSE (1976)] (“The initial assignment of attorneys in defender and assigned counsel 
programs should be an internal administrative function.”). 
 35. ABA PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 19, at 17. The black-letter standard to 
which this commentary pertains reads as follows: “The selection of lawyers for specific cases 
should not be made by the judiciary or elected officials, but should be arranged for by the 
administrators of the defender, assigned-counsel programs and contract-for-service programs.” Id. 
at 13. See also Principle 1 in A.B.A., ABA TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY 
SYSTEM 2 (2002). 
 36. Statutes in Maryland and Wisconsin, for example, provide that statewide defender 
programs may refer cases directly to private attorneys. See LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE 
CASELOADS, supra note 3, at 240 n.48 and accompanying text. 
 37. Id. A well-publicized effort by Missouri’s State Public Defender to assign the state’s 
governor to defend the criminal case of a person who could not afford counsel was rejected. 
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recommendation; it simply reflects the pervasive problem of underfunding 
public defense almost everywhere in state courts. 
V.  USE OF “CLIENT CHOICE” IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 
My final dream pertains to the United States adopting a policy that is well-
accepted in British Commonwealth countries. I refer to the use of free market 
principles applied to public defense, enabling defendants unable to afford 
counsel to select their own lawyers from among those wanting to provide 
defense services who have been screened and deemed qualified to do so. Only 
if a defendant declines to choose their own lawyer should an alternative 
selection system be used. In that event, the choice of counsel should be made 
by administrators of a public defender, assigned counsel program, or officials 
from another non-judicial entity. As discussed in the preceding section, for the 
reasons previously cited and consistent with recommended standards, judges 
should not to be involved in appointing lawyers.38 
During the early 1990s, I studied the public defense systems of England 
and Scotland in order to compare them with defense services in this country. In 
doing so, I acquired an appreciation of client selection of counsel and the 
extent to which the practice is highly valued by English and Scottish 
solicitors.39 For that reason, I was not surprised to learn that when the British 
government proposed to eliminate client choice in 2013, there was an angry 
 
See Celeste Bott, Court Rules Public Defender Can’t Appoint Missouri Governor as a Defense 
Attorney, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-
and-politics/court-rules-public-defender-can-t-appoint-missouri-governor-as/article_c59059f8-
98c8-50fe-9068-12a9b092b7f3.html [http://perma.cc/FT72-2VNH]. 
 38. See supra text accompanying notes 34 and 35. 
 39. I discussed my research on client choice in England and Scotland in Norman Lefstein, In 
Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England and the Need for Federal Help, 55 
HASTINGS L. J. 835, 915–20 (2004) and in LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS, 
supra note 3, at 241–49. Numerous law review articles and other publications support permitting 
defendants to select their own defense lawyer. See, e.g., Janet Moore, The Antidemocratic Sixth 
Amendment, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1705 (2016); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Client Choice for Indigent 
Criminal Defendants: Theory and Implementation, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 505 (2015); Stephen 
J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Reforming Indigent Defense: How Free Market Principles 
Can Help To Fix a Broken System, CATO INSTITUTE (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.cato.org/publica 
tions/policy-analysis/reforming-indigent-defense-how-free-market-principles-can-help-fix-bro 
ken-system [http://perma.cc/H6B9-ZSLY]; Janet C. Hoeffel, Toward a More Robust Right to 
Counsel of Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 525 (2007); Kenneth P. Troccoli, “I Want a Black 
Lawyer to Represent Me”: Addressing a Black Defendant’s Concerns with Being Assigned a 
White Court-Appointed Lawyer, 20 LAW & INEQ. 1 (2002); Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth 
Amendment for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: Do Reimbursement Statutes Support 
Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for the Indigent?, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 181 (1998). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] REFLECTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AFTER MORE THAN FIFTY YEARS 717 
outcry from British solicitors, so much so that the government abandoned its 
plan to abolish client selection of counsel.40 
Solicitors in both England and Scotland believe strongly that client choice 
fosters much stronger attorney/client relationships. Moreover, my interviews 
with British solicitors convinced me that the practice incentivizes lawyers to do 
the best possible work for their clients in order to receive repeat business from 
clients and be recommended for defense representation to future clients. In 
other words, client selection of counsel functions in exactly the same way that 
free enterprise operates in all other areas of commerce, whether the assistance 
provided is by doctors, dentists, plumbers, or others who provide services to 
the public. 
In this country, we have not seriously considered nor sought to replicate 
the practice of client choice, although the idea was addressed in some of the 
first standards prepared for the delivery of public defense representation.41 
Recently, however, the Texas Indigent Defense Commission (TIDC) launched 
the first-ever experimental program of client choice in the United States, 
beginning in February 2015 in Comal County, Texas.42 Comal County is 
 
 40. See Catherine Baksi, MoJ Unveils Tendering Plans for Criminal Defence, THE L. SOC’Y 
GAZETTE (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/moj-unveils-tendering-plans-for-
criminal-defence/70293.fullarticle [http://perma.cc/YZ7V-GDDC] (“On the removal of client 
choice, head of legal aid at the Law Society Richard Miller said: ‘Client choice is widely regarded 
as an important driver of quality in the justice system. It is very concerning, and revealing, that 
the government appears prepared to sacrifice this vital principle.’”); Press Release, Ministry of 
Just., Law Society and MoJ Agree New Proposals for Criminal Legal Aid, (Sept. 5, 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/law-society-and-moj-agree-new-proposals-for-criminal-
legal-aid [http://perma.cc/F5NR-69LD]. Justice Secretary Chris Grayling is quoted in the press 
release as follows: “The proposals we have agreed make sure legally-aided lawyers will always 
be available when needed and that people can choose the lawyer they want to help them.” Id. 
 41. In preparing this article I discovered an ABA statement respecting client selection of 
counsel that I previously had overlooked. In its first edition of ABA standards relating to defense 
services, the commentary regarding rotation of assignments to private lawyers contains this 
sentence: “Permitting the defendant to select the lawyer he wishes to represent him is one method 
for increasing his confidence that he is being provided competent counsel and of providing as 
nearly as possible the same conditions for the professional relation that obtain when counsel is 
retained by a defendant of means.” See r. 2.3 cmt. in ABA PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 
(1968), supra note 19, at 29–30. But outright endorsement of client selection of counsel is not 
contained in the black-letter standards of the first edition. NLADA standards developed several 
years later went further, endorsing client selection in a black-letter recommendation: “However, 
to the extent administratively feasible and consistent with the overall effectiveness of the system, 
the client should be afforded an opportunity to choose a particular attorney.” See Sect. 5.2 in 
NLADA GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE (1976), supra note 34, at 15. 
 42. A news release on the website of the Texas Indigent Defense Commission announced the 
start of the program: 
On February 2nd Comal County kicked off its first-in-the-nation Client Choice pilot 
project. Indigent defendants are now given the option to choose their attorney from the 
lawyers who have been qualified by the courts to handle indigent cases. The program 
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relatively small, with a population of approximately 120,000, situated between 
Austin and San Antonio. Defense services for those unable to afford counsel 
are provided by private lawyers serving as assigned counsel upon approval of 
the judiciary.43 
I have been personally involved with the program since its beginning, 
primarily developing procedures for its implementation in Comal County while 
working in close cooperation with TIDC staff and others. In addition, just as 
this article is being completed, in December 2016, I have had involvement in 
the program’s assessment and evaluation, which was publically released by the 
Justice Management Institute (JMI) of Arlington, Virginia, a few days before 
this article was finalized.44 
The TIDC experiment with client choice, implemented in close 
cooperation and with the support of Comal County’s judiciary, operated for 
twelve months, from February 2015 through the end of January 2016. 
However, Comal County’s six misdemeanor and felony court judges have been 
so pleased with the perceived benefits of client choice that the program 
continues to function in Comal County even though the demonstration period 
for the project has ended. That it has continued to operate beyond its scheduled 
twelve-month period due to the decision of the county’s judges is an important 
project finding in itself. 
 
aims to enhance the independence of indigent defense, foster more effective attorney-
client relationships, and create new and stronger incentives for attorneys to provide good 
quality representation. Not all defendants wish to exercise the choice option, so the county 
reverts to the attorney rotation system when defendants decline. The project includes an 
impact assessment report . . . . The program has generated significant interest in the press. 
On December 28, 2014, the Associated Press published the news story Indigent Defense 
Idea to Get First Test in U.S., which was picked up by dozens of media outlets around the 
country. 
Indigent Defense Newsletter: Comal County Client Choice Begins, TEXAS INDIGENT DEFENSE 
COMMISSION (2015), http://tidc.texas.gov/media/33921/1502newsletter-legalsize-.pdf [http://per 
ma.cc/49TX-H6VL]. 
 43. Three lists of lawyers are approved by the county’s judges to provide defense services: 
an “A” list of lawyers approved for the most serious felony cases, as well as all other cases of 
lesser seriousness, including misdemeanors; a “B” list of lawyers approved for the lesser serious 
felonies, as well as all other cases of less seriousness, including misdemeanors; and a “C” list of 
lawyers approved for representing defendants in misdemeanor cases. See COMAL COUNTY 
DISTRICT COURT PLAN PREAMBLE 6 (Oct. 27, 2015), http://tidc.tamu.edu/IDPlan/ViewPlan. 
aspx?PlanID=551 [http://perma.cc/CTU6-SU3P]; CLIENT CHOICE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN IN 
THE COMAL COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 5 (Jan. 9, 2015), http://tidc.tamu.edu/IDPlanDocuments/ 
Comal/Comal%20District%20Court%20Client%20Choice%20Implementation%20Plan.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/VL6T-GAZU]. 
 44. M. ELANIE NUGENT-BORAKOVE, FRANKLIN CRUZ & NORMAN LEFSTEIN, THE POWER 
OF CHOICE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF A SYSTEM WHERE INDIGENT DEFENDANTS CHOOSE THEIR 
OWN COUNSEL (JUSTICE MGMT. INST. 2017). 
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JMI’s final report of the Comal County client choice project demonstrates 
that even though the concept of client choice is new to the United States, it 
seems clear from the successful implementation of the program in Comal 
County that it can, at least in regard to assigned counsel programs, be 
implemented in other Texas counties and in other states. Moreover, 
implementation can be achieved without much difficulty and without the sorts 
of adverse consequences that some feared when the Comal County experiment 
was launched. For example, before the program began there were concerns that 
some of the defense lawyers in Comal County would engage in unsavory 
unethical advertising or solicitation practices in order to attract clients. But 
nothing of the sort occurred as there was a not a single incident of either 
advertising or solicitation among assigned counsel. 
The project also demonstrated that client choice could be implemented 
within the framework of Texas law, which was important because there was a 
desire at the outset to proceed with the project, if possible, without seeking an 
amendment of Texas statutes. Like many states, Texas provides that judges 
shall appoint lawyers who provide defense representation for those unable to 
afford counsel.45 To comply with the law, the system designed permits 
defendants to list their first three choices of a lawyer, in order of preference, by 
whom they would like to be represented, with the promise that a judge will 
appoint the first of the available lawyers selected by the defendant. Because of 
a belief that some lawyers might be overwhelmed with appointments due to 
their positive reputations among defendants, all assigned counsel were advised 
that they could remove themselves from appointment lists if they believed their 
caseloads were too large and would interfere with their ability to provide 
effective and competent representation in compliance with the Constitution and 
rules of professional conduct. 
Finally, it is important to note that from the beginning of the project a 
majority of defendants opted in favor of selecting their own defense lawyers. 
In felony cases, during the project’s year of operation, defendants exercised the 
option of client choice in more than seventy-five percent of all eligible felony 
cases. In misdemeanor cases, the client choice option was exercised in just 
under seventy percent of all cases. 
Admittedly, this brief summary of client choice in Comal County omits 
many of the issues and findings addressed in the project’s final evaluation 
report. But the discussion here should be sufficient to elicit interest in 
reviewing JMI’s final report. 
Finally, it is important to mention that client choice has an important 
constitutional dimension, as well as pro and con policy arguments beyond the 
present discussion. Although courts have often declared, including the United 
 
 45. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04 (2015). 
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States Supreme Court, that a person who cannot pay for their lawyer has no 
right to counsel of their choice,46 the Supreme Court of the United States 
declared in 2006 that the lawyer of one’s choice is “the root meaning” of the 
Sixth Amendment and cannot be denied to a defendant who has adequate funds 
to pay for his own lawyer.47 Accordingly, if a defendant with financial means 
is denied counsel of her choice, the conviction must be reversed without the 
need to show prejudice.48 In view of this determination, how can defendants 
unable to afford representation be denied the right to select their own lawyer 
consistent with principles of equal protection and due process of law? 
CONCLUSION 
One of my dreams for improving public defense is unlike the rest. I refer to 
client selection of counsel. In order to implement the practice, judges and their 
court personnel, as well as defense lawyers, must embrace the concept and 
procedures pursuant to which defendants are advised of their right to legal 
representation. But the implementation of client choice does not require large 
expenditures of public funds. 
In contrast, the other proposals advanced in this article are not likely to 
succeed without substantial additional financing. Whether a statewide defense 
program,49 federal funding for defense services in state courts,50 substantial 
private bar participation in public defense,51 or public defender referrals of 
cases to private lawyers,52 additional funding—sometimes a good deal of 
additional funding—is essential. 
We are now more than fifty years since the Gideon decision and the 
Supreme Court’s other historic “right to counsel” cases.53 Yet, the vast 
majority of public defense programs in this country are impoverished. 
Although public defenders and private defense lawyers are usually dedicated to 
 
 46. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (“[T]he essential aim of the 
[Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than 
to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.”). 
 47. United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006). 
 48. In the words of Justice Scalia, who authored the majority’s opinion: 
Where the right to be assisted by counsel of one’s choice is wrongly denied . . . it is 
unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth 
Amendment violation [of the right to counsel]. Deprivation of the right is ‘complete’ 
when the defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented by the lawyer he 
wants, regardless of the quality of representation he received. 
Id. at 148. 
 49. See supra text and accompanying notes 4–12. 
 50. See supra text and accompanying notes 13–16. 
 51. See supra text and accompanying notes 17–26. 
 52. See supra text and accompanying notes 27–37. 
 53. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 13. 
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doing the best they can for their clients, state and/or local governments provide 
insufficient financial help. Consequently, public defense in the United States is 
far too often assembly line justice involving a “meet ‘em and plead ‘em” kind 
of law practice, especially in misdemeanor and low level offense cases.54 And 
that should embarrass America’s state court judiciaries and the legal 
profession, because it is so far beneath what rules of professional conduct and 
constitutional principles require for defense representation.55 
In Gideon, Justice Black stressed the goal that every person, rich and poor 
alike, should stand “equal before the law.”56 But in the most recent, extensive 
nationwide report on the right to counsel published in 2009, the National Right 
to Counsel Committee, a bi-partisan group of experts assembled by the 
Constitution Project, painted a very different picture from the one envisioned 
by Justice Black: 
[T]oday, in criminal and juvenile proceedings in state courts, sometimes 
counsel is not provided at all, and it often is supplied in ways that make a 
mockery of the great promise of the Gideon decision and the Supreme Court’s 
soaring rhetoric. Throughout the United States, indigent defense systems are 
struggling. Due to funding shortfalls, excessive caseloads, and a host of other 
problems, many are truly failing. Not only does this failure deny justice to the 
poor, it adds costs to the entire justice system. State and local governments are 
faced with increased jail expenses, retrials of cases, lawsuits, and a lack of 
public confidence in our justice systems.57 
Since state and local governments have now had more than fifty years to 
“fix” public defense in this country, is it realistic to think that significant 
additional improvements in state court public defense systems can be achieved 
simply by persons of good will engaged in persuasive lobbying efforts? 
 
 54. See generally ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO, 
NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEFENSE LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE 
TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009); ABA GIDEON’S BROKEN 
PROMISE, supra note 3. 
 55. In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court reiterated that defense counsel’s 
representation must be reasonable under prevailing professional norms. 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010). 
The Court added that “[w]e long have recognized that ‘[p]revailing professional norms of practice 
as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are guides to determining 
what is reasonable . . . .’” Id. See also Cronic v. United States, 466 U.S. 648, 656, 659 (1984): 
[T]he adversarial process protected by the Sixth Amendment requires that the accused 
have ‘counsel acting in the role of an advocate.’ The right to the effective assistance of 
counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution’s case to survive the 
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. . . . [I]f counsel entirely fails to subject the 
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth 
Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable. 
(citations omitted). 
 56. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 57. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 3, at 2. 
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Admittedly, there have been many improvements in public defense since the 
Supreme Court’s right to counsel decisions, but there is little basis to believe 
that genuinely excellent, let alone even adequate public defense systems, will 
emerge in most states anytime soon absent something else. And that 
“something else,” I submit, is the intervention of appellate courts willing to 
recognize that the current state of public defense in state courts is simply 
unacceptable. In this respect, however, perhaps the recent past is prologue. 
During the past several years, several state supreme courts have rendered 
positive decisions when confronted with systemic challenges to public defense 
systems. The arguments set forth in these challenges and those that may be 
presented in the future are beyond the scope of this article.58 Clearly, however, 
state supreme courts have begun to recognize that defense lawyers representing 
persons unable to afford counsel must meet certain standards and that the 
status quo can be successfully challenged if this is not being achieved. The 
most prominent of these decisions are from state supreme courts in Florida,59 
Michigan,60 Missouri,61 New York,62 and Pennsylvania.63 
There has never been a United States Supreme Court decision at all similar 
to those in the state supreme courts mentioned. The Supreme Court has never 
addressed whether systemic deficiencies in public defense systems may be 
 
 58. An article in this law review issue argues for systemic challenges to public defense 
systems based upon workload studies with the use of Delphi panels and the need for lawyers to be 
free of conflicts of interest. See Stephen F. Hanlon, The Appropriate Legal Standard Required to 
Prevail in a Systemic Challenge to an Indigent Defense System, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 625 (2017). 
As of December 2016, no litigation invoking these arguments has been presented to any court. 
 59. Pub. Def., 11th Jud. Cir. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 279 (Fla. 2013) (based upon a showing 
of excessive caseloads, public defender office demonstrated cause for withdrawal from 
representing indigent defendants in non-capital felony cases). 
 60. Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 145 (Mich. App. 2009) (allegations of widespread 
constitutional violations as a result of the court-appointed, indigent defense systems were 
sufficient to state a claim for declaratory and prospective injunctive relief against state and 
governor). This decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals was sustained by the Michigan 
Supreme Court and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Duncan v. State, 
780 N.W.2d 843, 844 (Mich. 2010). 
 61. State v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 609 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (prior to appointing defense 
counsel, Sixth Amendment and attorney ethics rules require that a court consider counsel’s 
competency to provide representation and that counsel consider whether accepting appointment 
will require counsel to violate the Sixth Amendment and ethical rules). 
 62. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 222 (N.Y. 2010) (class of individuals assigned 
public defenders in various criminal proceedings stated cognizable claim for constructive denial 
of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel). 
 63. Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 718 (Pa. 2016) (cause of action exists entitling 
class of indigent criminal defendants to allege prospective, systemic violations of the right to 
counsel due to underfunding, and to seek an injunction forcing county to provide adequate 
funding to a public defender’s office, so long as class action plaintiffs demonstrate the likelihood 
of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] REFLECTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AFTER MORE THAN FIFTY YEARS 723 
challenged prior to a criminal conviction. If a favorable ruling of this sort were 
rendered by the Supreme Court, regardless of the precise theory on which it 
was based, the decision could have profound implications for providing 
defense services because it would make clear that state courts may insist that 
state governments provide the essential resources required for genuinely 
effective, adversarial public defense programs. This, in turn, could do much to 
enhance the cause of justice in this country during the next fifty years of the 
post-Gideon era. 
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